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Abstract
Contrary to the conventional belief that agricultural development in
developing countries primarily depends on the provision of formal institutions,
many countries have recognized from their past experiences that formal
institutions alone will not help to achieve agricultural development without
positive support from their informal institutions. It is a generally known
phenomenon that developing countries have introduced various types of formal
institutions (organizations, markets, rules and regulations, technology,
constitutions, etc.) without considering the importance of the informal
institution in agricultural development. This was one of the main reasons that
the growth rate of agricultural development, especially per capita food supply
remains lower in developing countries. Therefore, it is important to achieve
favorable support from the informal institutions (culture, attitude, ethics,
customs, caste, political beliefs, mutual trust, leadership, etc.) to formal
institutions to implement efficiently any type of development policy of the
agricultural sector. The present study attempts to investigate how informal
institutions are effecting achievement in agricultural development, particularly
the growth of production and marketing of agricultural products with special
reference to Sri Lanka.
I. Introduction
Contrary to the conventional belief that agricultural development in
――
developing countries primarily depends only on the provision of formal
institutions, many researchers in the recent past have argued that difference
in the level of agricultural outputs cannot be explained by formal institutional
factors alone. Although developing countries have introduced similar types
of formal institutions (organizations, markets, rules and regulations,
technology, constitutions, etc.) without investigating the role of informal
institutions, their growth rate of agricultural activities, especially per capita
food supply varies considerably in developing countries according to the
contribution level of these two factors, formal and informal institutions.
Therefore, it is assumed that total agricultural production not only depends
on economic factors like capital, land, labor, and water but also the quality of
both formal and informal institutions. However, the impact of these two
institutions, especially informal institutions on agricultural production and
marketing is not much studied.
Institutions might mean different things to different people and the
academic literature is also not very clear on its definition (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson, 2004). Institutions are generally defined as the rules of the
game, or humanly-devised constraints that shape human interaction
(North, 1990: 03). According to this definition, institutions prohibit, permit or
require a specific type of action, i.e. political, economic or social, that are
important for reducing transaction costs, for improving information flows
and for defining and enforcing property rights. Other scholars include in
their definition of institutions organizational entities, procedural devices, and
regulatory frameworks (Williamson, 2000: 595).
Institutions are categorized in various ways by different writers: market
institutions vs. non-market institutions (Hu, 2007: 9), external institutions vs.
internal institutions (Kasper and Streit, 1998: 28 extracted by Hu, 2007: 15),
fast-moving institutions vs. slow-moving institutions (Roland, 2004), formal
institutions vs. informal institutions (Laiglesia, 2006: 12). However, it is a
commonly known phenomenon that agricultural activities are governed not
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only by formal written rules but also by unwritten informal codes of conduct
and constraints such as norms of behavior and conventions of a society. In
this respect, institutions are classified into two major groups: 
	
	
 which are rules that are designed externally and imposed on
society by an external authority (state) and 	 	
	
 which are
rules that evolve within a society. Formal institutions consist of state
organizations: Ministry of Agriculture, Agrarian Service Center, Irrigation
Department, Rural Banks; Government Policies (e.g. land reforms, tariffs,
price controls, subsidies) and Marketing Facilities both for inputs and outputs.
The informal institutions include Mutual Trust, Culture, Attitudes, Ethics,
Customs, Religions, Caste, Political Beliefs and Community Leadership.
The basic argument for the role of informal institutions in economic
activity is that it reduces transaction costs. In most developing countries,
particularly in their rural agricultural sector where the formal institutional
architecture is either absent or in a poor state, the informal institutions gain
prominence by playing a more active role in reducing any kind of transaction
costs that engage in all the stages of their agricultural value chain. Therefore,
the analysis of the role of informal institutions in the process of agricultural
growth is necessary to understand how to overcome all the obstacles that
have been placed in the rural agricultural sector of developing countries.
Increasingly, economists as well as other social scientists have realized that
the behavior and transformation of formal institutions is a function of
 According to the institutional economic theory, real-world decision makers will always
function inefficiently relative to the hypothetical decision makers of neoclassical theory.
The argument of the major cause for this inefficiency is based on the idea that
transactions are costly. In the institutional economic theory, the concept of transaction
costs was first discussed by Coase (1937) in his The Nature of the Firm. Coases
argument is mainly based on the idea that cost of marketing transactions which
primarily consist of information costs, negotiations and contract costs should be taken
into account (Coase, 1960: 7). However, for this study, transaction costs include those of
information, negotiation, monitoring, coordination, and enforcement of contracts.
The Impact of Informal Institutions on Agricultural Production and Marketing:
The Experience of Sri Lanka
――
informal institutional factors. For example, Southworth and Johnston (1967)
notice that neither the technology nor the economics of industrial societies
can be simply transferred to developing countries whose traditional cultures
have been little touched by the ideas of modern sciences or of modern large-
scale economic organizations.
In this study institutions will be defined as a set of formal and informal
rules of conduct that facilitate coordination or govern the relationship
between individuals or groups. The study mainly aims to explore the
influence of informal institutions on agricultural production and marketing
with special reference to Sri Lanka. In addition, it also attempts to review
theories of informal institutions and their relations with agricultural
production and marketing to provide a base for the survey findings. Then
the study focuses on three main informal institutions, namely community
leadership, mutual trust and farmers attitudes, and their impact on
production and marketing of agricultural products in the study area.
II. Methodology of the Study
Data Collection: The data used in the analysis were collected from two types
of sources: a literature survey (secondary data); and a field survey (primary
data). Secondary data were collected from government and non-government
publications and unpublished reports kept by community organizations and
leaders in the survey villages. The field survey was carried out in the
 South Canal 	 
	 (GN) Division in 
electorate in Sri Lanka during May and June in 2009 (see Appendix A).
 village, the study area, can be divided into two major parts:
 GN division is a smaller unit of local administration which comprises one or more
villages. It was controlled by a village administrative officer called 	 in Sinhala
language until 1963, and since then this post changed into a village headman or so-called -
	 
	.
	
 
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Old  Colony and the Expanded Village. Old  Colony
was selected for the field survey because it is the core of the traditional
village of . The Old  Colony consists of two main
blocks: the 40th Block and the 25th Block. In the survey, 141 households (out
of a total 247 households) were selected using random sampling for the
interviews which represented the above two blocks. Collected data will be
analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS version 17.0).
Methodology of Analysis: The study has hypothesized that the agricultural
development of the country can be achieved by focusing on the institutional
outcome of the reduction of any kind of transaction costs that engaged in the
process of decision making and marketing of agricultural products used as a
foundation for the subsequent discussion. Figure 1 demonstrates the
structure of the model.
According to Figure 1, outcomes of this bottom-up approach are
considered to be the results of the behavior of individuals within both the
formal and informal institutional contexts. The formal institutions are mainly
formed by the government to facilitate its top-down administrative activities.
The informal institutions are identified as an intangible resource of the
farmers community itself which has an influence, directly or indirectly, on
farmers decisions and their marketing activities. Although there are various
informal institutional factors which can influence the agricultural
development in any country, this study mainly focuses on three main
informal institutions, i.e. mutual trust, attitudes and community leadership.
In order to understand the possible role of informal institutions in agricultural
development in any developing country, it is important to examine how these
institutions can reduce the higher transaction costs that are engaged not only
in the process of farmer decision making where farmers decide on what crop
to grow, how much land to allocate foreach crop and arrange working capital
finance, but also in the process of marketing products. This study identifies
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that the major cause of higher transaction costs is a lack of positive support
from the informal institutional factors. For example, if there is no
trustworthy relationship between farmers and traders/buyers or between
farmers and government officials, it may be a major obstacle, particularly for
farmers obtaining the correct information. As a result, farmers have to use
time and resources to secure the correct information, otherwise lack of
information and information asymmetry lead to inaccurate decision making
and lower bargaining power. In addition to the information search costs, the
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
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costs that relate to observing, negotiating, or monitoring some events are
also considered as a part of transaction costs. However, this study suggests
that the transaction costs dealing with information search, monitoring or
observing, etc. could be reduced if there is positive support from the informal
structure of the society. For example mutual trust accumulated through
personal interactions in the community increases the strength of cooperative
relationships and hence reduces any type of transaction costs. Thus, the
conceptual framework assumes that if informal institutions support
positively to reduce higher transaction costs in the process of decision
making and marketing, it would help to get the optimum use of resources and
hence high productivity. High productivity will increase farmers income in
the short-term and if it continues without fail, it would be possible to develop
the agricultural sector in the long-term. However, this study is limited to
analyzing the impact of informal institutions on farmer decision making and
marketing of agricultural outputs, and it will not attempt to discuss the short-
term or long-term economic benefits of institutional outcome in detail.
III. Informal Institutions, Agricultural Production and Marketing:
An Overview of Theories
Farmers in both rich and poor countries rely on informal institutions to
facilitate their agricultural activities, but these institutions are relatively
more important in poor countries where formal institutions are less
developed. Theoretically, as neoclassical economists assumed, if information
is perfect so that transactions through the market are costless and agency
contracts between farmers (principal) and government agencies (agent) are
faithfully enforced the appropriate mix of these two formal institutions
(market and state) provide an adequate basis for the developing agricultural
sector to alleviate rural poverty (Hayami and Goto, 2005: 310). In developing
countries, however, information is imperfect, and the degree of imperfection
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is comparatively larger in the agricultural sector, resulting in pervasive
market and government failures. In addition, market failures are not only not
corrected but even enlarged by government failures. Such formal
institutional barriers can prevent economic development and agricultural
progress. These barriers are created by contradicting institutional
frameworks, and by clashes between formal and informal institutions.
In economics, production can be defined as the result of a combination of
production factors like land, labor, capital, etc. However, unlike
entrepreneurs in the industrial sector, farmers do not have a good knowledge
of combining the production factors according to market demand. In general,
most farmers in developing countries where formal institutions are less
developed grow whatever crop they want, without paying much attention to
future market demand. The absence of positive support from informal
institutions may constrict farmers for such irrational behavior. For example,
if farmers have not built up a trustworthy relationship with traders and
grass-root level agricultural development officials, it may be a major barrier
to farmers acquiring future market information and hence their non-market
oriented behavior. At the same time, if farmers and traders can make a
trustworthy agreement like contract farming, where a trader provides
seeds, inputs and agrees to buy output at specific price, it would offer farmers
a great incentive to make their various decisions on the combination of
production factors in an optimum way. Thus, trust is important when
decision-makers rely on information from others under conditions of
uncertainty.
The community leadership, appointed by the government authority or
by the community, can also assist in reducing the transaction costs of their
community members providing reliable information. For example, if an
agricultural community has a leader to control irrigated water, he provides
reliable information on when a water canal is open, how many days per week
it is open and when it is closed. Then, farmers can decide when to cultivate
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and what to cultivate without wasting time. Additionally, community leaders
can reduce transaction costs through the correct information and services
provided by the higher level of government and private sector that rural
farmers are often unable to access. Therefore, the information given by
community leaders helps farmers to reduce their transaction costs while not
only saving time but also lowering risk and uncertainty.
Mainstream neoclassical economic theory suggests that markets exist
in which prices arise from the interaction of supply and demand, and that
prices thus generated lead to the efficient allocation of resources in the
economy as a whole and hence to maximum welfare. However, this happens
under a very restrictive set of conditions which are rarely found in reality.
For example, markets have to be perfectly competitive, which suggests that
no individual agent is able to exert any form of market power over another
agent; also, all agents must have complete and perfect information about the
goods or services that are being traded. Under these conditions, neoclassical
theory can demonstrate that the economy will arrive at an equilibrium set of
prices that allows for the efficient allocation of resources. This theory has
been extremely powerful because it suggests that markets are the most
efficient way of allocating resources, and it was this theory that underscored
the view that getting prices right would enable economic development to
take place.
From the point of view of institutional economic analysis, markets can be
seen as institutions in themselves, which operate within a wide set of formal
and informal rules and norms. According to Hodgsons (2008) definition;
 Neoclassical economists like Marshall, Walras, Stigler, Robbins, etc. focused the idea
that the determination of prices, outputs, and income distributions in markets through
supply and demand, often mediated through a hypothesized maximization of utility by
income-constrained individuals and of profits by cost-constrained firms employing
available information and factors of production, in accordance with rational choice theory
(Antonietta Campus, 1987: 323).
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This definition is helpful in clarifying that markets are both underpinned
by wider institutions in the economy and in its clear recognition that they
have their own structure of rules and norms that enable them to operate. In
order to obtain a reasonable price, farmers need to be able to have access to
both input and output markets that are non-discriminatory and non-
exploitative. But when market participants do not rely on the basic norms of
trust that guarantee a fair transaction, such market functions are not
conductive to promoting greater well-being. If people are generally truthful
and honest, it is easier to undertake contracts and conclude transactions
because it is simply not possible to commit oneself to a written agreement
every time one makes a transaction. In this way, institutional economic
theory of marketing has led to the recognition that markets require a wide
variety of institutions in order to work effectively. Hence, the transition to
getting institutions right is significantly related to the view that markets can
work to allocate resources effectively while benefiting all market participants
if they have a positive support from their institutional framework.
A case study which was done in Sri Lanka by Silva and Ratnadiwakara
(2008) has found that there are significant costs attached to information
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search and hence transaction costs associated with all stages of the
agricultural value chain starting with the decision to grow and ending with
the sale of produce at the wholesale market. The total transaction costs
associated with all the stages were accounted for 15.2 per cent of the total
cost and 11 per cent of those costs were information search costs. In the
decision stage, information search costs included visits to meet farmer
association officials and other neighboring farmers to decide on a crop to
grow; costs of arranging finance where the farmers had to pay multiple visits
to banks and other finance institutions to obtain application forms,
completing them and finding guarantors. In addition, some farmers leased
the land from others and this process had also involved quite a search for
information. During the selling stage, it was found that the costs of
comparing prices of different markets and traders accounted for most costs
while finding transport to physically carry the produce to the selling market
also incurred a fair share of information search costs. Their case study
reveals that although a number of various formal institutions (divisional level
agricultural development centers, state banks, wholesale markets, etc...) have
been created to facilitate farmers in their agricultural activities, farmers
information search costs are still higher in Sri Lanka because of the lack of
mutual trust between farmers and the other agents.
IV. Impact of Informal Institutions on Agricultural Production:
The Experience of the Study Village
The production composition of the studied village is categorized into two
major groups: paddy and vegetables. Since the fact that paddy, the staple
food of the people in Sri Lanka, is produced mostly for consumption purposes,
it was observed from the field survey that nearly 87 per cent of the farmers
had cultivated paddy in the  season in 2008. Among them, there are
some farmers who cultivated paddy to market since their attitude toward
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net revenue from paddy tended to be higher than other crops. The other
major vegetables cultivated in the study area were big onion, chilli, long bean,
sweet potato, capsicum, tomato, okra, cucumber, gourd, and egg plant.
However, the yield levels attained in almost all crops cultivated in the study
area are much less than the potential.
It is important to note that most of the farmers in the study area do not
consult with any agricultural development officers before they make
decisions on the allocation of production factors for a certain crop.
Particularly in the  season when the available water resource is scare for
paddy cultivation, the 	 officer explains the advantages of crop
diversification at the 
 meeting. However, the survey reveals that
many farmers do not trust this government official. They claimed that
politically biased bureaucrats in the 	 Authority of Sri Lanka ask
farmers to grow less-water-consuming crops since they want to bring much
water to another electorate which belongs to a powerful cabinet minister of
the government. At the same time, the lack of trust between farmers and
officials has also caused farmers to rely on the information given by the non-
officials (mainly input-sellers) and depend on their trustworthiness, even
though they neither have enough education nor experience of using inputs to
advise farmers. For example, in the study area, more than half of the
 In Sri Lanka, there are two major cultivation seasons associated with two monsoons
and they are known as  season and  season.  season is the main season
associated with North-east monsoons effective during September  April in the
following year.  season is the secondary season which is associated with South-west
monsoons effective during the period between May to September.
 	 Officer from  	 Block Office is mainly responsible for
discussing the seasonal irrigation schedule prepared by the 	 Block Office with
the farmers at the 
 meeting, while introducing them to proper crops for the next
season.
  meeting is a type of cultivation season meeting which is usually held at the
start of the cultivation season at the village temple in  village.
	
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farmers who receive knowledge and information about new seeds and
cultivation methods are consulted by non-officials like the private traders in
 town, or the village boutique and fellow farmers. However, the
high risk of such information given by the non-officials may lead farmers to
take inappropriate decisions. Furthermore, distrust which causes
uncooperative behavior by the farmers with governmental officials effects
negatively on the decision making of both parties. The ultimate result would
be excess produce and hence a low market price.
Another important point is that most of the farmers in the study area do
not think about market before they cultivate. They usually depend on other
factors when they make a decision on what crop, when, and how much to be
cultivated. According to Table 1, about one fourth of the farmers selected
vegetables because they usually cultivated them every  season. Nearly
20 per cent of the farmers decided to grow vegetables for  in 2008
because of the high price at the market when they were planted. In addition,
about 17 per cent of farmers cultivated the same crops that the neighboring
farmers cultivated in order to avoid risk of excess water utilization and agro
chemical applications. Moreover, 13 per cent of the farmers who had
cultivated vegetables for  season in 2008 selected vegetables considering
their high prices at the market in the previous year (the 2007  season).
The main reason for farmers negative attitude towards market-oriented
Table 1: Reason for Selecting Vegetable Cultivation, 	 Season in 2008
Reason % of Farmers
Regular crop in every  season 23.4
High price at the market when it was planted 19.5
Favorable weather conditions 7.8
Neighboring farmers grow the same vegetable 16.9
Low pesticide / fertilizer requirement 7.8
High demand at the market 7.8
High price at the market last  season (2007) 13.0
Low water requirement 3.9
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behavior can be identified as the lack of mutual trust among farmers, traders,
and agricultural development officials.
As it is obvious from the data given in Table 1, negative attitudes of
farmers towards market-oriented behavior have been the major barrier for
crop diversification. Most farmers, particularly paddy farmers, believe that it
is not necessary to think about market before they cultivate, while claiming
that none can predict the future prices under the situation where market
prices are fluctuating daily. Some other farmers comment that it is difficult
to acquire reliable market information through the current marketing
system and they blame agricultural development officials for not being able
to provide future market information. However, it is important to note that
information from these three parties which include farmers, traders, as well
as agricultural development officials is necessary to make a good prediction
for future market demand. If there is no trustworthy relationship among
these three parties, they may provide wrong information and it would lead to
wrong prediction. The ultimate result would be the inefficient resource
allocation and hence low farmer income.
Contract Farming which can be defined as an agreement between
farmers and processing and /or marketing firms (including exporters) for the
production and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements,
frequently at predetermined prices, is one of the methods which is commonly
used to strengthen coordination in the agro-food chain and to minimize the
future market risk in both developed and developing countries. However,
producing on a contractual basis is not a new phenomenon to the farmers in
Sri Lanka. Even some farmers in the study area have practiced contract
farming several times, however, they were unable to succeed in getting the
benefits of the system. The success of the system is highly dependent on the
mutual trust between two parties. This is because the basis of a contract
farming arrangement is a commitment on the part of the farmer to provide a
specific commodity in quantities and at quality standards determined by the
	 
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Table 2: Factors Affecting Informal Institutions in the Decision Making of Farmers on
Agricultural Production
Explanatory
Variable
Dependent Variable
Trust in Agricultural Development Officials
Farmers attitude towards
market-oriented behavior
(Negative=0, Positive=1)
Trust in Agricultural
Production
& Research Assistant a
(Bad=0, Good=1)
Trust in
 Officer b
(Bad=0, Good=1)
Age -0.02 -0.004 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Education Level -0.31 0.11 0.00
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16)
Land Size 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Income Level 0.000004 0.00001 0.000003
(0.00001) (0.000006) (0.000009)
Land Ownership 0.05 -0.09 0.48
(0.32) (0.36) (0.36)
Constant -0.80 0.31 -0.55
(0.80) (0.91) (0.89)
Link function: Probit
a Since the Agricultural Production and Research Assistant (APRA) appointed by the government is mainly
responsible for the grass-roots level agricultural activities, he/she is considered in this study as one influential
official in farmer decision making.
b The government officer appointed by the  Authority of Sri Lanka is considered as the other
influential figure in farmer decision making, since he/she is mainly responsible for discussing the seasonal
irrigation schedule prepared by the regional block office with the farmers, while introducing them to
proper crops for the next season.
buyer and a commitment on the part of the buyer to support the farmers
production and to purchase the commodity.
	 
 The study used regression analysis while applying
Ordinal Regression Method (ORM) with Probit link function. This was
expected to test whether there is any statistical relationship between the
dependent variables that were used to represent quality of informal
institutions related to the decision making of the farmers on agricultural
production in the study area and measures (explanatory variables) of those
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dependent variables (see Table 2). According to the regression results (Table
2), the coefficient of education of farmers is statistically significant at the 5
per cent level. However, coefficients of other all variables are not statistically
significant. But it should be noted that these data reveal some level of
relationship among these variables and such relationships always contribute
to making better farmer decisions in the agricultural sector in Sri Lanka.
Moreover, even though the education of farmers is statistically
significant, it is negatively related to farmers trust in the Agricultural
Production and Research Assistant (APRA). It means that educated farmers
in the study area are not willing to listen to APRAs who have been appointed
by the politicians. In spite of that, the positive sign on farmers education
reveals that educated farmers keep a trustworthy relationship with
 officers who were appointed under a proper procedure. This
indicates that educated farmers in Sri Lanka are not ready to accept
politically appointed government officials like APRAs. Therefore, policy
makers must understand that education itself does not contribute to building
up a trustworthy relationship between government agencies and rural
farmers without paying attention to the weak points in political appointments.
Moreover, the negative relationship between farmers age and their trust in
agricultural development officials indicates that elder farmers who have
more experience in their agricultural activities are not willing to listen to the
officials. This might be due to the fact that the view of elder farmers remains
we know more from our own experience and better than the young officials
 The population probit model with multiple regressors is 	
      
Φβ β  β   β , where the dependent variable Y is binary, Φ is the
cumulative standard normal distribution function and X, X etc., are regressors. The
probit coefficients β, β, βk do not have simple interpretation. It means that the values
of the probit coefficients are difficult to interpret but the sign and statistical significance
are not. The model is best interpreted by computing predicted probabilities and the
effects of a change in a regressor (Stock and Watson, 2007: 392).
	
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who have less practical knowledge. Furthermore, the positive signs on land
size and farmers income imply that the farmers with more land and higher
incomes keep a trustworthy relationship with the officials. The negative
relationship between the age of farmers and their attitude towards market
oriented behavior reveals that elder farmers tend to grow whatever crop
they want, without paying much attention to the future market demand.
Moreover, the neutral relationship between the education level of farmers
and their attitude towards market oriented behavior reveals that current
education has no impact on farmers market oriented behavior. Land
ownership, income level and land size are positively related to farmers
attitude towards market oriented behavior. It means that farmers who have
higher income and more lands under their ownership tend to cultivate
according to market supply and demand.
V. Impact of Informal Institutions on Agricultural Marketing:
The Experience of the Study Village
The marketable surplus of both paddy and vegetable products depends
on the household demand for consumption and demand in the market.
Despite the fact that the government of Sri Lanka intervenes in purchasing
paddy every year, particularly in the harvesting season through its formal
marketing channel, the marketing of paddy in the study village is largely
dependent on regional private marketing channels. Another significant
characteristic is that a huge vegetable marketing centre called 
Dedicated Economic Centre (DDEC) plays the main role in the trading of
vegetable produce in the study area.
 Dedicated Economic Centre
The most important objective of the establishment of the DDEC was
also to provide a reasonable price for farmers while protecting them from
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cheating by the middlemen. In this respect, commission traders were
expected to collaborate with farmers to increase farmers income by
reducing transaction costs by providing better information, better price and a
lesser time for negotiation and enforcement. Commission traders are
allowed to take a commission for every transaction as a charge for their
service while the negotiations are performed openly in a transparent manner
in the presence of the parties involved. In this respect, nearly 35 per cent of
the farmers in the study area trust their commission traders saying that they
always assist in improving the farmers bargaining power. However, the real
situation that exists in the market is that the commission traders handle
farmers in a cunning way to win farmers trust. Therefore, even though 35
per cent of the farmers said that they can trust commission traders, it is
difficult to see a real trustworthy relationship between these two parties. At
the same time it is important to note that few farmers who had provided
quality products regularly have formed a good relationship (it is like an
informal agreement) with buyers via their commission traders. Even though
buyers do not visit the DDEC, they order commission traders over the phone
to collect the produce that those farmers brought. Therefore, reducing
uncertainty through personal relationships that establish trust becomes
 The  Dedicated Economic Centre (DDEC) which is located about 10
kilometers away from the study area was established in 1999 and today it is the Islands
largest wholesale market for fruits and vegetables with reported sales of over US
$300,000 a day. The market has 144 trade stalls spread across the 12 acre market
managed by commission traders who act as brokers in the transaction between the
farmers and buyer. Farmers and collectors from all districts bring produce to this
market and the same is then dispatched to every nook and cranny of the country; as
many as a thousand trucks pass through the market at night. Trading starts in the
evening at about 4 p.m. and goes on past midnight. Even a branch of the peoples bank is
open till the wee hours in the morning to settle accounts. However, in reality, farmers do
not always get a good price and traders do not necessarily get the best quality of the
product.
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important, especially in the case where the formal institutional environment
does not offer suitable enforcement mechanisms.
However, practically, it seems that buyers have more bargaining power
at the DDEC. Buyers decide the price according to the supply at the market.
They quickly understand the available supply of various products within a
short time when they take 2-3 rounds around the market. Within the first 2-3
hours, farmers strongly reject buyers offers. At this time, commission
traders behave in a cunning way while encouraging farmers not to sell for
buyers offers. Commission traders know from their past experience the
time when farmers get fed up with bargaining. When farmers become fed up,
commission traders tell them that it is better to sell for the available price or
otherwise you may have a lower price after time passes. Whatever the
farmers price, commission traders receive their commission. Therefore, the
majority of the farmers in the study area claimed that the commission
traders do nothing for farmers and some farmers criticized commission
traders while alleging that they cheat innocent farmers.
Market Information at  Dedicated Economic Centre
The dissemination of correct information on supply, demand and price
among all market agents is a pre-requisite for a well-functioning market. If
there is a lack of market information or/and information asymmetry, it leads
to inefficient market functions and hence higher transaction costs.
Information asymmetry supports opportunistic behavior by traders,
particularly when distances between production areas and main consumer
markets are greater. Information about consumer preference and prices on
the main markets may not be readily available for (remote) farmers, and
obtaining them may be very costly. Thus traders having this information can
decide not to share it with farmers or provide farmers with misinformation (e.
g. state lower prices than those in the main markets, or not provide
information on consumer preferences with respect to grades or product
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Table 3:Market Information on Vegetable Marketing
Market Information % of Farmers
Gathering Market Information
Yes 81.5
No 18.5
Source of Market Information
Fellow farmers 50.8
DDEC commission trader 44.6
Media 4.6
characteristics). However, Table 3 reveals that about 82 per cent of the
vegetable farmers in the study area collected market information before they
sell the products. Moreover, it was found that before coming to the market,
nearly half of the farmers depend upon word-of-mouth from other farmers
and expect to receive similar prices in the market. The 45 per cent of the
rest who do not trust their fellow farmers personally visit the DDEC.
However, they have to bear additional observation transaction costs due to
their personal observation at DDEC premises to collect market information
from the commission traders. Thus it is quite clear that it is the information
fed by the commission trader that the farmer receives and on which he bases
his selling price decision. However, the reliability of the market information
in the DDEC and the other distant markets is highly dependent on the trust
between farmers and commission traders.
Marketing Problems
An attempt was made to recognize the marketing problems of the
vegetable farmers which arose in disposing of their marketing surplus
through the DDEC. This study has identified three main problems which
seriously hampered the marketing of vegetable produce: the low market
price for farmers produce; time wastage at the DDEC; and transport
difficulties. As shown in Table 4, non-availability or inadequacy of
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Table 4:Major Marketing Problems
Types of Problem % of Farmers
Low market price 76.2
Time wastage at the DDEC 15.9
Transporting problems 4.8
No problem 3.2
opportunities to obtain reasonable prices is the first serious marketing
problem for the farmers in the study area. As it was indicated previously,
the lower bargaining power of the farmers in price determination in the
market may have an impact on this problem. The absence of newly available
market information is a major cause of the low bargaining power of the
farmers in the study area. The asymmetry of information between farmers
and traders has been identified due to the lack of mutual trust between these
two parties.
Time wastage appears to be the second most important marketing
problem for the vegetable farmers in the  area. It was revealed
from the field survey that farmers average waiting time at the DDEC is
about 5 hours, while some farmers had to wait for more than 10 hours. Many
farmers complained that when the waiting time period increases, they
gradually lose their bargaining power and hence products are sold at a low
price.
It is a common practice for buyers to run down the quality of products in
the bargaining process, in order to purchase goods at a lower price. However,
the commission traders insisted that it is difficult to assure the quality of
farmer products without checking all the containers one by one since
farmers do not care about packing method and grading. It was also revealed
from the field survey that almost all farmers in the study area usually used
poly-sack bags as the common packing material for almost all types of
vegetables (except for tomatoes). The main problem of this packing method
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is that farmers used this material to pack over their capacity in order to
reduce their transportation costs. It is interesting to note that though the
Institute of Post Harvesting Technology and DDEC Management Board
together have decided to provide plastic vegetable containers at a subsidized
price of Rs. 75.00 (actual cost is Rs. 300.00), this is not familiar yet among the
farmers in the area. The main reason, which was found from the survey, is
those farmers negative attitudes toward quality packing. According to
Table 5, before using plastic containers, 88 per cent of total vegetable
cultivating farmers predict that packing quality does not give enough
incentive to increase market price. Moreover, 85 per cent of the farmers
indicate their negative attitudes toward grading and standards while 23 per
cent of them clearly claim that they can earn a higher income without
grading. In fact, it is obvious that market forces in Sri Lanka also do not
encourage quality of packing or grading. Particularly, consumers in Sri
Lanka are not much responsive to quality packing or the quality of the
products.
The main reason for the major problems regarding production and
Table 5: Farmers Attitudes towards Packing and Grading
Farmers Attitudes Percentage
Towards Quality Packing
Quality packing increases market price 12.3
Quality packing does not increase market price 33.3
Since vegetables should be marketed soon, I do not care about the
quality of packing 26.0
Price increases are not enough to cover packing costs 28.4
Towards Grading
I do not care about grading 6.3
Grading increases market price 15.2
Grading does not increase market price 19.0
Price increases are not enough to cover grading costs 19.0
I have no time, because vegetables should be marketed soon 17.7
I can earn a higher income without grading 22.8
	 


――
marketing of farm products in the study area can be recognized as the
absence of a powerful Farmer Organization. Even though 
Authority of Sri Lanka has created single purpose Farmer Organizations for
each sub-canal in order to manage irrigated water resources, they are not
powerful organizations. The Farmer Organization must be a member-based
organization created by farmers to provide services that support the
members farming activities. Such a Farmer Organization can reduce
transaction costs which are related to all stages in the agricultural value
chain. For example, a major source of transaction cost in marketing can be
recognized as the asymmetric information between farmers and buyers. A
Farmer Organization can solve (part of) this problem, as it has better
information on the quality and reliability of the producer. Having better
information on the characteristics of the producer can be based on two
sources. First, when the Farmer Organization is strongly embedded in a
(local) community, the informal communication channels within this
community can be used to collect information on particular producers.
Second, because most farmers (and farmer families) are long-term members
of the Farmer Organization, the latter has ample opportunities to collect
information on the characteristics of the producer.
The most common complaint made by the commission traders in DDEC
as well as the other buyers against farmers in the study area is that the
quality of their products is very low. However, a well-organized Farmer
Organization can support such producers to increase the quality of products
if farmers are relatively uniform in productivity and quality. For instance, if
there are large quality differences, the higher quality farmers will have less
interest in allowing a Farmer Organization to negotiate contracts, or in
selling collectively with lower quality farmers. Such a pressure within the
community may push lower quality producers to increase their quality
before they go to the market. On the other hand, policy makers propose that
processing and exporting are very important to encourage vegetable farmers
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in Sri Lanka. In the case of processing or exporting, the buyer requires large
quantities of relatively uniform quality and then a Farmer Organization
might provide gains in both organizing production and sale, but also
collection, sorting and so on.
It is important to note that Farmer Organization is not a new
phenomenon to the farmers in Sri Lanka. The village level Farmer
Organizations set up so far has failed to achieve the expected results mainly
because the level of participation of the farmers was very low. One of the
major factors for the low level of farmer participation can be identified as
farmers negative attitude towards Farmer Organizations. Since
independence, particularly after 1977 with the beginning of the Accelerated
 Development Pregame, government has focused on Farmer
Organizations basically in order to facilitate water resource management at
the grass-roots level. As a result, farmers attitudes towards Farmer
Organizations built up as a single-purpose government ( Authority)
created institution playing the role of water resource management and not
their own institution which helps to improve their socioeconomic conditions.
Therefore, in order to develop powerful Farmer Organizations, the attitude
of the member-farmers towards the role of the Farmer Organizations should
be changed by empowering mutual trust among the farmers, giving more
opportunities for members to make decisions.
	 
 Table 6 shows the statistical relationship between some
selected dependent and independent variables related to vegetable
marketing in Sri Lanka. Regression results of the analysis reveal that
veteran farmers, educated farmers, as well as the farmers who cultivated
many types of vegetables have a positive attitude towards collecting
marketing information before harvesting their crops. However, negative
signs indicate that rich farmers and farmers who cultivated more land area
do not pay much attention to collecting market information before harvesting.
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Table 6: Factors Affecting Informal Institutions in Vegetable Marketing
Explanatory
Variable
Dependent Variable
(1)Farmers
attitudes towards
collecting market
information
before harvesting
(Negative=0,
Positive=1)
(2)Farmers
attitude towards
grading
(Negative=0,
Positive=1)
(3)Farmers
attitude towards
quality packing
(Negative=0,
Positive=1)
(4)Trust in DDEC
commission
traders (Bad=0,
Good=1)
(5)Farmers
attitude towards
the availability of
market bargaining
power
(Negative=0,
Positive=1)
Age 0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
Education
Level
0.10
(0.20)
0.30
(0.21)
0.14
(0.22)
0.08
(0.17)
-0.15
(0.17)
Land Sizea -0.20
(0.34)
-0.01
(0.34)
-0.03
(0.39)
-0.04
(0.29)
0.34
(0.30)
Income Level -0.000009
(0.00001)
- -0.000003
(0.00001)
0.00002
(0.000006)
-0.000007
(0.000009)
No. of Vegetable
Varieties
0.23
(0.22)
0.15
(0.21)
-0.17
(0.24)
-0.003
(0.18)
0.17
(0.18)
Constant 0.12
(1.30)
2.82
(1.36)
0.09
(1.41)
0.12
(1.06)
-1.90
(1.06)
Link function: Probit
a Total vegetable cultivated land area in 2008  season
Rich farmers in the study area do not care much about market information
since they have a close relationship with DDEC commission traders (the sign
on the income level of farmers in trust in DDEC commission traders is
positive). Nevertheless, it does not seem that farmers who cultivated more
land area keep a trustworthy relationship with the DDEC commission
traders, their attitude towards the availability of marketing bargaining
power remains positive and therefore they harvest without gathering
market information. Such a positive attitude implies that those farmers
might have confidence in their ability to influence the market forces since
they (farmers who cultivate more land area) usually harvest more output
than the other farmers.
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The results also reveal that veteran farmers, educated farmers, as well
as the farmers who cultivated many types of vegetables have a positive
attitude towards grading. However, the negative sign on land size indicates
that when the extent of cultivated land area increases, farmers may try to
sell their vegetable production without grading. Moreover, although
educated farmers are willing to use quality packing for their products,
veteran farmers, the farmers with more land and high income, and the
farmers who cultivate various vegetable varieties do not seem very keen on
the quality of their packing method. It is also obvious from the regression
results that farmers who cultivate more land and various vegetable varieties
do not much trust the commission traders. The main reason for such distrust
might be their positive attitude towards the availability of farmers market
bargaining power. When the cultivated land area and number of cultivated
vegetable varieties increase, farmers may believe that they can influence
market forces without the support from the commission traders. However,
all the others: veteran farmers, educated farmers, as well rich farmers
believe that they have less bargaining power at DDEC market.
VI. Concluding Remarks
New Institutional Economic literature has emphasized that formal
 In In institutional literature, significant differences have been identified between the
Old Institutional Approach associated with the names of Velben and Commons and the
New Approach developed by institutional economists such as Ronald Coase, Oliver
Williamson and Douglass North. Redek & Susjan (2005: 996) have found two major
differences in these two approaches: the old institutional economics rejects the
hypothesis of a rational economic player in favor of one that places economic behavior in
its cultural context (see Neale 1987 and Hodgson 2000). For new institutionalists
mankind is still a rational chooser, but more focus is given to the role of institutions.
Economists have taken these two different approaches to understanding institutions as
they attempt to understand which institutions are relevant for growth and development.
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institutions do not alone determine agricultural development in developing
countries without positive support from their informal institutional structure.
The study has found that the informal institutions negatively influenced the
decision making of farmers on agricultural production and hence higher
transaction costs. The decision making process of the farming community in
the study area reveals that they have a negative attitude towards market-
oriented behavior. In general, most farmers produce various agricultural
products according to availability of land, labor and other resources rather
than considering using such resources towards market demand of the
country. Thus crop diversification has not been successfully practiced in the
area as a means of increasing their agricultural income as well as a solution
for water limitation. Even though agricultural development officials can
intervene to change farmers way of thinking, this seemed to be difficult in
the study area since there was no strong trustworthy relationship between
farmers and officials who represent agriculture related formal institutions.
In particular, regression results found that elder farmers who have more
experience in their agricultural activities are not willing to listen to the
officials, and educated farmers refuse to trust politically appointed officials
like APRAs. Therefore, it is a common practice in the study area that most
farmers select the crop/crops that they usually cultivated every year or
follow their fellow farmers when they make a decision on what crop, when,
and how much to be cultivated.
It is also interesting to note that the informal institutions have negatively
affected agricultural marketing in the study area. Since vegetables as well as
paddy surpluses of  farmers are mainly marketed through
private sector marketing channels, the farmer-trader relationship is very
important for the benefit of all parties. The survey discovered that the
majority of the farmers in  village seriously suffer from an
inadequacy of opportunities to obtain a reasonable price, mainly because of
their lower bargaining power in the price determination. The absence of
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newly available market information is a major cause of the lower bargaining
power and the asymmetry of information between farmers and traders has
been identified due to the lack of mutual trust between these two parties.
Regression results also imply that, particularly elder farmers as well as
farmers who cultivate various vegetable varieties and more land area do not
much trust the commission traders in DDEC. However, the absence of a
trustworthy relationship between farmers and commission traders in the
study area has supported middlemen in extracting exorbitant profits. This
has caused an increase in the price gap between the producer and consumer.
Furthermore, though government agencies have planned to increase the
quality of products while reducing the post-harvest wastages via providing
plastic vegetable containers at a subsidized price, it is not familiar yet among
the farmers due to their negative attitude towards quality packing and
grading. Such a negative farmer attitude, in turn, can be viewed as an
opportunity for buyers to run down the quality of products in the bargaining
process.
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Appendix A
Map 1: Layout of the Study Area
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